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Religious and cultural minorities are today often exempted from rules that continue to bind their fellow citizens, particularly
when these rules directly burden minorities' freedom of religion--for example, restrictions on the carrying of knives in public that
prevent Sikhs from carrying one of their five articles of faith, the kirpan (a metal dagger) (1)--but also when the universal
enforcement of rules, such as crash helmet laws, would prevent minorities from accessing opportunities more readily available
to members of more dominant groups. While multiculturalists celebrate the provision of cultural exemptions as realizing a more
substantive equality than that achieved under a difference-blind model of citizenship, (2) critics argue that cultural exemptions
are unwarranted in theory and discriminatory in practice. The fairness of the law, it is argued, is not a function of the size of the
burden that it imposes upon minorities and majorities alike but of its facial neutrality. This requirement is met insofar as no
individual or group is explicitly discriminated against and all enjoy formally equivalent opportunity sets. (3) Indeed, critics claim
that the provision of exemptions is here not only unnecessary, it is unfair. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, "[i]t would be quite
repugnant if there were one law for the rich and another for the poor"; so why should there be one law for religious minorities
and another for the rest of the citizenry? (4) After all, cultural minorities are not the only groups who are substantially burdened
by general rules. Crash helmet laws, to take one off-cited example, also heavily burden the interests of Hell's Angels, who
strongly desire to ride with the wind in their hair. Yet, the state's interest in reducing the number of serious injuries from
motorcycle accidents is here considered to justify forcing Hell's Angels to wear crash helmets; so why should Sikhs be excused
from the obligation to wear a crash helmet? (5)
The upshot of this critique is that we should treat the burdens of minority cultural and religious commitments much like the
costs of expensive tastes: just as people can reasonably be expected to internalize the costs of their tastes, minorities can be
expected to shoulder the opportunity-costs of their religious and cultural commitments in the face of otherwise generally
applicable laws. So if Jews and Muslims find that they cannot eat meat because they are unwilling to eat animals that have
been slaughtered while unconscious, that is simply a cost that they must endure for the sake of their beliefs in the same way
that someone who will only eat organic, sustainably farmed meat may too have to go without meat because of her objection to
dominant farming practices. (6) In this paper, I explain why this critique of exemptions is mistaken and why commitment to the
principle of equality of opportunity, understood in resource-egalitarian terms, supports the provision of certain cultural
exemptions. I do so by pointing to a number of important differences between the way in which people endorse their deep-
seated convictions and commitments of conscience (of which I take the religious and cultural commitments at issue in
exemption claims to be examples) and the way that people hold the sort of expensive tastes that feature prominently in the
"equality of what" debate. (7) Many of the religious and cultural commitments at issue in exemption claims, I argue, have the
status of beliefs, and people cannot simply decide to forsake beliefs because of their costliness in the way that someone might,
for example, choose to forgo fine claret for a cheaper alternative in the face of resource constraints. A further important
difference between people's attachment to their religious and cultural commitments, on the one hand, and their attachment to
their preferences and tastes, on the other, is that a person's self-respect is not as bound up with the satisfaction of his or her
tastes and preferences as it is with the integrity of his or her religious beliefs and cultural commitments. Whereas a person who
is unable to indulge her expensive tastes is unlikely to lose respect for herself as a result, because of the way in which people's
self-respect is bound up with their conviction in the value of their life-plan and their belief that they act and will continue to act in
ways that are prized by that life plan, having to forgo one's religious and cultural commitments can be highly destructive of self-
respect. If I am fight about this, important implications follow for how we ought to treat the provision of exemptions from a
resource-egalitarian perspective in that we cannot reasonably expect people to have to forgo their religious beliefs and cultural
commitments for the sake of accessing the liberties, opportunities, and resources that they, along with everyone else, are
entitled to as a matter of justice.
This is a controversial line of argument that is frequently criticized for treating people's religious beliefs and cultural
commitments "as effectively unchosen, rigid, and inhospitable to contestation." (8) After all, if religious and cultural
commitments are voluntary and contestable, then they are chosen, and egalitarian justice only requires us to reduce unchosen
disadvantages. But we don't have to treat people's religious and cultural commitments as immutable attachments in order to
understand why they cannot easily be revised in the face of resource constraints or to see how they differ from expensive
tastes. Indeed, even autonomously endorsed commitments of conscience can be unrevisable in the face of resource
constraints in the sense that the costliness of these commitments is not the sort of consideration that can motivate their rational
revision. In section 2, I set out this argument in more detail and I defend the distinction between the revisability of religious
beliefs/cultural commitments and preferences/tastes at greater length. However, before taking up these arguments it is
necessary to say something about the sort of exemption and accommodation claims that I am interested in defending, not least
because the exemption and accommodation claims at issue in the vast literature on group-differentiated fights concern a
diversity of normatively irreducible issues.
1. A Typology of Claims
Because they frequently involve the removal of an obstacle to the free exercise of religious belief, exemption claims are often
characterized as contestations over freedom of religion and the right of the state to coerce citizens' liberty of conscience.
Debates regarding the exemption of religious minorities from drug prohibitions that make their ritual ceremonies unlawful are
often characterized in these terms, with commentators such as Michael McConnell arguing that exemptions follow from a
pluralist understanding of the constitutional protection to the free exercise of religion.
(9) This may be a good description of what's at issue in these particular disputes, but not all exemption claims can be so easily
reduced to contestations over the right to freedom of religion. As is evident from the brief list below, exemption and
accommodation claims raise a diversity of conceptually distinct and normatively irreducible issues:
* Exempting Halal and Kosher abattoirs from animal slaughtering regulations
* Allowing Jewish citizens to vote a day early because the election date falls on the Jewish Sabbath
* Exempting Muslim students from having to sit exams during Ramadan
* Allowing Sikhs to wear their turbans while working on construction sites, riding motorcycles, in the police force, and in school
* Exempting religious minorities from mandatory educational requirements, such as excusing Amish children from the
requirement to attend school up until the age of sixteen and exempting Muslim students in Canada from compulsory music
classes
* Exempting Native Americans and Rastafarians from drug prohibitions
* Exempting religious communities from prohibitions against discrimination in employment (10)
These claims for accommodation do not lend themselves to being analyzed in singular terms. Some, for example, concern
corporately exercised privileges, whereas others concern privileges that can only be exercised by individuals. For instance,
while it is up to individual Sikhs to decide whether or not to wear a turban instead of a hard-hat or crash helmet, only a
congregation can refuse to hire a woman as its priest. There are exemptions that fall between being corporately or individually
exercised. An example here might be the exemption of Native Americans from the ban on peyote if the privilege to ingest
peyote as an act of worship only applies when members of the Native American Church come together in congregation.
Whether an exemption is individually or corporately exercised has implications for its justification. Corporately exercised
exemptions raise the issue of the extent to which sub-state communities may structure their associational life along illiberal
lines, highlighting the tension between safeguarding the liberty of individuals and recognizing group rights. This is a complex
issue that requires setting out an account of the limits of liberal toleration and the right of groups to associate in illiberal ways,
something that I cannot hope to achieve here. Instead, I will concentrate on the merits of claims to individually exercised
exemptions, though even here important distinctions must be made.
Claims that seek the reform of laws so as to allow minorities to engage in practices that are currently prohibited even in private-
-smoking marijuana, female circumcision, ritual slaughtering of animals--can be distinguished from exemptions that enable
minorities to retain certain practices within particular institutional settings (schools, the police, the military) that they are
otherwise permitted to engage in, such as wearing the hijab or turban. While the former are perhaps best described as
contestations over the boundaries of liberal toleration, the latter are better described as raising "questions of control over
resources, exclusion from benefits of political influence or economic participation, strategic power, or segregation from
opportunities." (11) Mandatory uniform requirements and crash helmet laws, for example, do not directly coerce the religious
freedom of Sikhs or prohibit them from wearing a turban; they merely impose certain opportunity costs on those Sikhs who
refuse to give up wearing a turban. As Lord Widgery judged in response to Sikh claims that motorcycle safety laws prevented
the free exercise of their religion, "No one is bound to ride a motor cycle. All that the law prescribes is that if you do ride a motor
cycle you must wear a crash helmet." (12) What is therefore at issue in exemption claims of this sort is the legitimacy of the
opportunity costs that general rules impose upon minorities because of their beliefs and commitments--having to forgo riding
motorcycles, attending public schools, voting in an election and so on--rather than minorities' right to exercise the beliefs and
commitments that produce those opportunity costs in the first place. It is exemption and accommodation claims of this sort that
I will be concerned with defending. I focus on these sorts of claims because, as I argue below, the refusal of an exemption in
these instances deprives members of religious and cultural minorities of their fair share of the primary goods to which they are
entitled as a matter of justice. By primary goods, I mean here the set of all-purpose means that citizens need access to so as to
enable them to freely form, revise, and pursue life-plans and to participate as equal members of society. (13) These include,
among other things, basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of
diverse opportunities, access to the powers and prerogatives of office, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect,
as well as those goods, such as education, that the enjoyment of these basic liberties, opportunities, and resources depends
on (e.g., all must have access to education if citizens are genuinely to enjoy free choice of occupation against a background of
diverse opportunities). (14)
This way of defending the provision of exemptions and accommodations necessarily calls to mind the equality-of-what debate
over the sorts of inequalities that we should try to reduce as a matter of justice. In particular, should we only care about
inequalities in people's shares of primary goods or should we also care about other sorts of inequalities that might cause some
people to undeservedly suffer diminished life chances? For instance, people with disabilities require more resources to achieve
the same level of functioning and to enjoy access to the same sorts of opportunities as people without a disability, and so
merely ensuring equality of resources will not ensure that people with disabilities enjoy equal life chances. (15) This criticism of
equality of resources has been largely taken on board by resource egalitarians, who now recognize that justice requires
reducing the effects on people's life chances of inequalities in their circumstances over which they have no control, such as
being born with a disability. (16) For instance, ensuring that all enjoy access to the good of education requires the differential
treatment of persons in that those who are vision-impaired need to be provided with books and information in a format they can
access, such as Braille--something that can be very costly. It would be unfair to make the vision-impaired pay the additional
costs of meeting their educational needs, as this would leave them with fewer resources than sighted people with equivalent
aims and ambitions to spend on the pursuit of their projects. How well a person's life goes should be a function of her level of
ambition, not the circumstances in which she finds herself. Hence, we must not allow the pattern of advantages and
disadvantages in society to be determined by inequalities in people's circumstances over which they have no control. (17)
Welfare egalitarians argue that similar considerations support compensating those with unchosen expensive tastes for the
additional costs of realizing their preferences. (18) If it is unfair that some should be worse off than others through no fault or
choice of their own, holding people responsible for the costs of their tastes is inconsistent, as it unfairly forces those with
unchosen expensive tastes to suffer diminished opportunities for well-being. Consider someone who has acquired an
expensive taste through no fault of her own, such as someone who develops an interest in horse-riding after being encouraged
from an early age by her parents. As an adult she finds that no other hobby can provide her with the same level of enjoyment
and satisfaction as horse-riding because of how adept she has become at it and the enjoyment she now gets from taking part
in show-jumping competitions. She is now unable to give up horse-riding without suffering a considerable loss of well-being.
Welfare egalitarians argue that in such a case of an unchosen expensive taste, we ought to subsidize the costs of people's
tastes, since not to do so is to allow brute luck to give rise to morally arbitrary inequalities between people in terms of their
opportunities for well-being. (19) But although resource egalitarians now accept that justice requires reducing the effects of
undeserved inequalities in people's circumstances on their opportunities to pursue aims and ambitions, resource egalitarians
stop short of compensating people for differences in the costs of realizing their preferences and tastes, even when these are
unchosen. Individuals, resource egalitarians insist, must accommodate their aims, ambitions, preferences, and tastes to the
share of resources that they can expect to receive under an equality of resources schema. (20)
One reason why resource egalitarians are reluctant to subsidize expensive tastes is that distributing resources according to the
costs of people's preferences and tastes means taking from some so that others can have more. This inevitably reduces the
liberty of those with less costly preferences and tastes to freely form and revise their conceptions of the good. To see this,
suppose that Smith prefers option A (costing $60) and Jones prefers option B (costing $40) and that there is $100 to distribute.
Smith is given $60 and Jones $40 so that each may choose his preferred option. Suppose also that there are multiple A's and
multiple B's so that, in choosing A, Smith does not deny Jones the opportunity to choose A. Nonetheless, if Jones is only given
$40 he cannot choose A should he change his mind about the value of B, whereas Smith continues to enjoy the opportunity of
choosing B should he change his mind about the value of A. This is partly why resource egalitarians insist on specifying
people's entitlement claims in terms of an objective list of liberties, opportunities, and resources that does not turn on the
content of people's preferences, tastes, or ambitions and by which interpersonal comparisons of advantage and disadvantage
are to be made.
I cannot possibly do justice here to the complexities of the equality-of-what debate. Nonetheless, it is helpful to briefly consider
the difference that adopting a resourcist rather than welfarist approach makes if we allow that disadvantages stemming from
differences in people's religious beliefs and cultural commitments can give rise to distributive claims. Take the example of the
additional costs that Jews and Muslims who, for religious reasons, will only eat the meat of animals that have been slaughtered
while conscious face in acquiring meat in a society in which stunning animals before slaughter is common practice. In the same
way that it is possible that a preference for horse-riding might be an unchosen expensive taste, it is not too difficult to imagine
circumstances in which a taste for Kosher or Halal meat could equally be seen as an unchosen expensive taste. And if
someone with an unchosen expensive taste for Kosher or Halal meat would suffer diminished well-being were he or she unable
to eat such meat, a welfare egalitarian approach plausibly requires us to subsidize the purchase of Halal and Kosher meat. But
a resource-egalitarian approach will not do so unless it can be shown that the opportunity to eat meat is a primary good or all-
purpose means that all are entitled to as a matter of justice (and I am not aware of any resource egalitarian who would make
this claim). Insofar as the opportunity to eat meat is not a primary good, any obstacle that certain Jews and Muslims might face
in procuring meat as a result of their religious commitments does not itself result in their enjoying an unequal share of primary
goods. Hence, they have no claim for accommodation or special treatment. This point highlights an important point of
difference between the provision of cultural exemptions and the subsidization of expensive tastes: whereas the subsidization of
expensive tastes necessarily involves distributing resources unequally between those with cheaper and more expensive tastes,
the provision of cultural exemptions, by contrast, is aimed at ensuring that all enjoy an equal share of primary goods. The
welfare egalitarian argument for the subsidization of unchosen expensive tastes rejects the notion that people's entitlement
claims can be specified with reference to an objective list of primary goods that does not turn on the content of people's
preferences, tastes, or ambitions. But the criticism that this paper levels against resource egalitarians who dismiss cultural
exemptions as being unnecessary and unfair is altogether different: it is not that providing all with an equivalent share of
primary goods is unfair to those with expensive tastes, but rather that minorities do not enjoy access to the same share of
primary goods as members of more dominant religious and cultural groups when the rules governing access to those primary
goods require minorities--but not the majority--to forgo their religious and cultural commitments.
2. Egalitarianism, Culture, and Choice
Notably, when general rules governing access to important goods or opportunities make it more difficult for people with
disabilities to avail of those goods or opportunities, resource egalitarians are generally agreed that justice requires exemption
and accommodation. Consider rules against taking animals on public transport, from which people with vision impairment are
generally excluded. (21) This exemption is justified on the basis that the universal application of a ban on the carrying of pets
would make it extremely difficult for people who are vision-impaired to travel on public transport, and all should have access to
public transport. For similar reasons, people with diabetes are exempted from rules that prohibit the carrying of syringes in
public places, such as schools. (22) If there is a justice case for exempting people with disabilities and health needs from
general rules, why is there not a similar case for exempting religious and cultural minorities from general rules that similarly
constrain their enjoyment of important goods and opportunities? Egalitarians give a number of reasons for distinguishing
between the exemption claims of people with disabilities and those of religious and cultural minorities. One initial reason
appeals to the idea that disabilities are un wanted disadvantages that people feel they would be better off without, whereas
people endorse their religious beliefs and cultural commitments. As Brian Barry writes, "somebody who freely embraces a
religious belief that prohibits certain activities will rightly deny the imputation that this is to be seen as analogous to the
unwelcome burden of physical disability." (23) However, the idea that they should treat their disability as an unwelcome burden
is anathema to many who have a disability. Robert Sparrow here cites examples of deaf parents celebrating in neonatal wards
"upon learning that a child will be unable to hear' and of deaf couples seeking genetic counseling "in an attempt to ensure that
their children will be born deaf." (24)
What many people who are deaf regret is not their deafness but the disadvantages that attend to deafness in a society in which
the means of communication have been rigged "in ways that leave them out of the conversation." (25) Similarly, Sikhs, Jews,
Muslims, and other minorities burdened by general rules may regret the opportunity costs that they have to endure because of
their minority status, without having to regard being Sikh, Jewish, or Muslim as an unwelcome burden. Consider here the
distinction that Peter Jones draws between the burdens (or direct costs) and consequences (or indirect costs) of beliefs. (26)
Abstaining from meat in a society that prohibits the slaughtering of conscious animals is a consequence of the interaction
between certain interpretations of Jewish belief and contemporary slaughtering laws. But abstaining from eating pork is a
burden of belief for some Jews in that they would refuse to eat pork regardless of how it was prepared. The person who
believes that eating pork under any circumstance is a violation of Jewish law will not treat his inability to eat pork as an
unwelcome disadvantage or think that his life would have gone better had he been able to eat pork. But this is different from
the Sikh who cannot ride a motorcycle or join the police force only because societal rules prevent him from wearing his turban
while riding a motorcycle or serving in uniform. Such a person can regret the opportunity costs that he must endure for the sake
of wearing his turban without having to treat turban-wearing itself as an unwelcome burden.
A second way in which egalitarians distinguish between the accommodation claims of those with disabilities and those of
religious and cultural minorities appeals to the idea that whereas "individuals who are disabled or sick have not chosen their
condition," the disadvantages facing minorities as a result of holding the religious and cultural commitments that they do are
disadvantages that they could have avoided by choosing to "renounc[e] their religion or reinterpret[] it in a manner that makes
accommodation requests superfluous." (27) Hence, there is no obligation to reduce the disadvantages facing minorities as a
result of holding the religious and cultural commitments that they do, since these are chosen disadvantages.
The force of the idea that justice requires that people pay for the costs of their choices is well captured by Will Kymlicka's
example (adapted from Ronald Dworkin) of the tennis player who chooses to work only a few hours a day so that he can spend
the rest of his time playing tennis. As a result, he earns considerably less than his neighbor, the industrious gardener, who has
deliberately chosen to work hard so that she can earn more (both are equally talented and start out with the same resources in
the example). Since the tennis player "could have chosen income-producing gardening if he wished, just as [the gardener]
could have chosen non-income producing tennis," the inequality in resource holdings between the two is not unjust, or so
Kymlicka argues. (28) Indeed, were we to tax the gardener to compensate the tennis player for his lack of income this would be
to unfairly force the gardener to pay the full costs for her choice of income over leisure while relieving the tennis player of
having to pay the full costs of his choice for leisure over income. Notice here that it is incidental whether the tennis player or
gardener acquired their respective tastes deliberately or through no fault of their own. Indeed, resource egalitarians argue that
people should take responsibility for their preferences and tastes "whether or not they have arisen from [their] actual choices."
(29) What matters is not whether the gardener and tennis player deliberately cultivated their respective tastes for gardening
and playing tennis, but that the tennis player could have given up playing tennis all day so as to spend more time in productive
work. Similarly, we might say that even though religious and cultural commitments may be commitments that people have
acquired through upbringing rather than choice, religious and cultural minorities should still have to pay the costs of those
commitments just insofar as they can choose to forgo or change those commitments in the face of any opportunity costs they
might face.
The point of the resource-egalitarian idea of holding individuals responsible for the costs of their choices is to encourage
people to consider the cost that their choices impose on themselves and on others, in the expectation that they will make
decisions that are less costly than others they could have made. (30) But, as Rawls acknowledges, this expectation is only
reasonable on the presumption that "citizens can regulate and revise their ends and preferences in light of their expectations of
primary goods." (31) I want to suggest that while this might be a reasonable presumption as far as many of the tastes that
feature in the well-known examples of expensive tastes are concerned, we cannot similarly expect people to revise or to forgo
their religious beliefs and cultural commitments in the face of resource constraints. First, this is because many (though by no
means all) aspects of people's religious and cultural commitments have the status of beliefs. And beliefs, as Peter Jones
explains, do not function as options that can be simply given up because of their costliness in the way that one might decide to
choose a less expensive vacation when faced with more limited resources:
"[C]hoosing to believe" implies an optionality of a sort that is not normally a part of the believing process. I choose to go to
France for a holiday when I might have chosen to buy a yacht or to have spent my money on something else. But it is not
similarly open to me to choose to believe that the square on the hypotenuse is not equal to the sum of the squares of the two
other sides of a right-angled triangle. Nor can I simply opt to believe that New York is in Canada or Mexico rather than in the
USA. (32)
Beliefs are not the sort of thing we can knowingly bring about or undo through an act of volition. (33) We do not believe
something because we "choose" to do so (though the desire to believe something can of course motivate us to find confirming
evidence). Indeed, the idea that we could will beliefs would undermine our confidence in the veracity of our beliefs. As Bernard
Williams explains,
[i]f I could acquire a belief at will, ... I could acquire it whether it was true or not; moreover I would know that I could acquire it
whether it was true or not. If in full consciousness I could acquire a "belief" irrespective of its truth, it is unclear that before the
event I could seriously think of it as a belief, i.e. as something purporting to represent reality. (34)
The act of giving up or acquiring a belief is thus very different from a volitional action, such as choosing from a dinner menu,
where a person can acknowledge that it is only because of her wish to eat salmon that she has chosen it; that she could just as
easily have chosen steak instead. (35)
Consider the difference between the way in which people identify with their career choices, such as choosing to become a
professional footballer or choosing to study for a Ph.D., and the way in which they identify with their religious and cultural
commitments. The professional footballer can plausibly acknowledge that there are many things he might have done instead of
being a professional footballer, while the Ph.D. candidate can admit that she could have been a civil servant had she wanted to
and that her life might have still gone reasonably well had she done so. Admitting that they could have clone otherwise in no
way jeopardizes the integrity of their choices. By contrast, most Christians will dispute that they could have become a Muslim
had they wanted to; that the fact one is a Christian rather than a Muslim is merely a product of one's preference for Christianity
over Islam (or vice versa). (36) This is not to say that religious believers are incapable of changing their religion or of giving up
religious belief altogether. (37) People can--and often do--come to reject their religious beliefs in light of what they take to be
epistemically or morally superior alternatives. Nonetheless, religious conversion should not be confused with deciding to
pursue one option rather than another simply because one wants to. The convert comes to see the error of her previous ways.
She is "drawn," "found," or "saved"; she does not choose one religion when she might have chosen another, thinking that her
life might have gone reasonably well either way. She does not see herself as being free "to make a genuine decision between
two viable alternatives." (38)
Critics of exemption rights argue that distinguishing beliefs from other sorts of preferences and tastes in this way entails
treating religious and cultural commitments as immutable attachments, beyond contestability and revision. However, nothing in
the argument entails that believers lack autonomy or treat their beliefs and commitments as being beyond contestability. The
point is not that beliefs per se are unrevisable or incontestable, but that resource considerations provide the wrong sorts of
grounds for motivating people to revise their religious beliefs or cultural commitments. Indeed, the argument is consistent with
recognizing diversity of belief within religious and cultural communities, since there can be diversity of belief within a community
and yet each member may still treat her particular interpretation of the requirements of her faith as being more than just a
preference for one way of believing rather than another that can be adapted in response to resource constraints. Indeed, even
commitments of conscience that are endorsed in a wholly autonomous way can strike those holding them as being
nonrevisable for the sake of resources. Consider a secular pacifist who wants to go to university to study philosophy so that he
can write a book on the immorality of war. He cannot afford the tuition fees, but the military has posted an advertisement in his
local newspaper offering university scholarships to cadets in training. If he agrees to train as a cadet, the military will cover the
costs of his tuition so long as he serves for at least five years in a combat unit. Suppose that this scholarship is the only way
the pacifist can afford to go to university. Does he enjoy a meaningful opportunity to go to university in this instance? The
pacifist's beliefs about the wrongfulness of warfare will prevent him from taking up the scholarship since he cannot, in good
conscience, take up a scholarship that requires him to violate core convictions of his conscience. As William James puts it,
"when his interests clash with the world ... [the believer] is not free to gain harmony by sacrificing the ideal interests. According
to him, these latter should be as they are and not otherwise." (39) Of course, there will always be examples of people who do
sacrifice their ideal interests when they clash with the world, Peter's denial of Christ being one of the better known examples.
But what is especially significant about cases in which people either choose or are made to forgo their convictions of
conscience is the destructive effect this can have on a person's sense of integrity and self-respect.
Self-respect in the sense of a person's "secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out"
and "a confidence in one's own abilities, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions" is considered by many
egalitarians to be the most important primary good. (40) Indeed, Rawls argues that the parties to his original position "would
wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect" since without it "nothing may seem worth
doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them." (41) To this end, individuals' ability to form, revise,
and pursue their conceptions of the good is contingent on the possession of self-respect. But people's self-respect can be
corroded if they see themselves as acting in ways that violate the norms and patterns of behavior prized by their conception of
the good. This is because people's self-respect depends on their viewing themselves as committed "to a conception of a
worthwhile and appropriate life and of themselves as living that life." Robin Dillon refers to this form of self-respect as
evaluative self-respect. The person with evaluative self-respect, Dillon argues, "believes that [she] acts in accord with [her]
conception of worthy behavior and has confidence that [she] will continue to do so." (42) Conversely, if she believes that her
behavior is wholly unbefitting of a person committed to her conception of the good, her confidence in her own ability to act in
ways that are valuable and worthwhile will be corroded. This can in turn elicit shame insofar as the ashamed person "believes
she has fallen short of her ideals; she thinks she could and should have done or been better. She regards herself as less than
she ought to be and her worth as thereby threatened." (43)
This point about the relationship between self-respect and belief in the worthiness of one's behavior points to a further point of
difference between having to give up one's religious and cultural commitments for the sake of resources and having to revise
one's tastes and preferences in favor of cheaper alternatives. Having to give up on one's tastes can cause people considerable
regret, and people may regard the fact that they were unable to indulge their tastes as highly unfortunate. But this is different
from feeling shame or from suffering a wound to one's self-respect. (44) Consider again the example of the person who
acquires an expensive taste for horse-riding as a result of her upbringing. If, due to a lack of resources, she is unable to pursue
this expensive taste, she may well suffer some loss of well-being compared to the person whose favored hobby is cheaper to
pursue. She may well hold that her life would have gone better had she been able to ride horses more regularly. But it is not
obvious that she might think any less of herself as a person on the basis of her not being able to ride horses as much as she
would have liked. Compromising on the pursuit of her favored pastime in this way is not the sort of compromise that amounts to
a compromise of herself. By contrast, precisely because religious beliefs, cultural commitments, and other deep-seated
convictions of conscience are more central to people's sense of integrity and self-worth, acting (and being made to act) in ways
that go against these beliefs and commitments is the sort of compromise that can amount to a compromise of oneself, one that
can be devastating to a person's evaluative self-respect. We see this clearly in the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo, where Muslim detainees were deliberately exposed and forced to engage in sexual behavior prohibited by the
Koran, precisely so as to humiliate them. (45) This relationship between people's self-respect and their fidelity to their religious
beliefs and cultural commitments helps us to see why "the decision of a Muslim girl to wear the headscarf cannot be put on the
same footing as her male classmate's decision to wear a cap." (46) As one French Muslim student responded when
interviewed by the media, "What does this veil mean to me? It's part of who I am. It's not just some bit of fabric on my head. It's
everything. Looking back on it, I can't imagine taking it off." (47)
People's self-respect can also be wounded in a second way by laws that require them to forsake their religious and cultural
commitments. Rawls often talks of the good of self-respect not just in terms of individuals having a subjective confidence in
their ability to pursue valuable and worthwhile life projects, but also in the more comparative sense of individuals having a
sense of their own dignity and standing as equal persons whose needs and interests matter as much as those of their fellow
citizens and who are equally capable of leading their lives from within. When Rawls talks about individuals' self-respect being
"secured by the public affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all," it is this notion of self-respect that he seems to have
in mind: (48)
The basis for self-respect in a just society is not then one's income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental
rights and liberties. And this distribution being equal, everyone has a similar and secure status when they meet to conduct the
common affairs of the wider society. No one is inclined to look beyond the constitutional affirmation of equality for further
political ways of securing his status. Nor, on the other hand, are men disposed to acknowledge a less than equal liberty. For
one thing, doing this would put them at a disadvantage and weaken their political position. It would also have the effect of
publicly establishing their inferiority as defined by the basic structure of society. This subordinate ranking in public life would
indeed be humiliating and destructive of self-esteem. (49)
Robin Dillon proposes the term recognition respect to distinguish this sense of having respect for oneself from the evaluative
self-respect described earlier. (50) It is a sense of self-respect that is derived primarily from one's sense of interpersonal worth
and status as a member of the community of persons rather than from one's subjective confidence in one's ability to act in
accordance with one's beliefs about the good. What thus matters for a person's self-respect is one's "understanding of oneself
as a person with a certain value and standing in the moral community" and one's belief in one's "fundamental interpersonal
worth"; "that as a person one is owed the equal respect of others, including their respect for one's basic rights." (51) Whether
people enjoy such recognition self-respect is influenced to a considerable degree by how they are treated by others and by the
design of social and political structures. As Dillon argues, "the experience of a person may not be the experience of being a
moral equal. A poor woman of color in contemporary American society may not have the same experience of interpersonal
worth as a privileged white man and so may lack recognition self-respect." (52)
The denial of equal rights can be especially destructive of recognition self-respect. (53) But as multiculturalists have argued,
individuals' recognition self-respect is as much a function of how the social groups with which they identify are treated by the
state as it is a product of the distribution of the fundamental rights and liberties. (54) For even if cultural minorities enjoy formal
equality with other citizens, the tacit establishment of majority forms of cultural identification as the norm in the public sphere--
through the selection of public holidays, choice of dress codes, and the tone of a society's media---coupled with an insistence
on the privatization of minority forms of identification can undermine minorities' confidence in their standing as persons who are
entitled to be treated with equal dignity and consideration. Such privileging of majority forms of cultural identification "allow[s]
the particular experience and perspective of privileged groups to parade as universal," thereby constructing the differences that
minorities exhibit "as lack and negation." Thus, those who wear religious headdress in schools and in places of work are
viewed not merely as different but as deviant, while "[j]ust as everyone knows that the earth goes around the sun, so everyone
knows that gay people are promiscuous, that Indians are alcoholics, and that women are good with children." (55) What such
groups receive from their fellow citizens is not recognition of their status as equal persons but "only the judgment that [they are]
different, marked, or inferior." (56)
The social groups that matter here to people's recognition self-respect are not the sort of organizations or associations
centered around the pursuit of common hobbies and pastimes, such as a chess club or football club, but the communities that
provide members with a shared sense of history and identity that colors their experience of the world and through which
nonmembers relate to them. The social groups that play this role in people's lives are typically the ethnic, racial, and cultural
communities with which they identify and by which they are identified. As Iris Young points out, "our identities are defined in
relation to how others identify us, and they do so in terms of groups which are always already associated with specific
attributes, stereotypes, and norms." (57) This is not to claim that organizations, such as clubs and voluntary associations, are
unimportant to people's lives. However, membership in a club association, unlike people's ethnic or cultural membership, is
largely a politically invisible feature of their lives in that it rarely defines how they are treated and perceived socially,
economically, and politically by nonmembers and by state institutions. A person can leave her club memberships behind in
social life. But even someone who no longer wishes to identify as a Native American will find that this social identity continues
to cast a long shadow over how she is perceived and treated by others.
The problem here as far as exemption claims are concerned is that "[t]he 'identity' assertions of cultural groups usually appear
in the context of structural relations of privilege and disadvantage." (58) And when the commitments of privileged majorities are
rarely if ever burdened by the state, the refusal to accommodate minorities' cultural commitments can convey to minorities that
they do not count as persons who deserve to be treated with equal dignity and respect. The case of Employment Division v.
Smith (1990), involving an appeal by two members of the Native American Church against a decision to deny them social
security after they had lost their jobs for ritually ingesting peyote, illustrates this point. (59) The claimants argued that Oregon's
ban on peyote violated their constitutional fight to freedom of religion but the court rejected this argument on the grounds that "if
prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object ... but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable law and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." (60) This ruling departed from an earlier ruling,
Sherbert v. Verner, in which it was held that a law infringing a person's exercise of her religion could only be enforced against
her if the state could demonstrate that the law serves a compelling interest that cannot be adequately served by less
burdensome means. (61) The difficulty with this decision is that Native Americans can point to the fact that "when legislatures
have adopted prohibitions of alcohol use they have made exceptions for the sacramental use of wine." (62) They can also be
confident that the privilege to ritually ingest peyote would have been granted had the sacramental use of peyote been a
mainstream religious practice. Whether the prohibition is intentionally discriminatory or not, it is incidentally affecting Native
Americans in a way that it would never have been allowed to do were they a more dominant social group. This is a cause for
Native Americans to feel unjustly treated, since it is only because they are a minority that they are being asked to forgo their
religious and cultural commitments. The law signals that their "preferences, values or beliefs ... are comparatively less
significant than those of their fellow citizens and as such are less worthy of consideration." (63) Their sense of themselves as
citizens of equal dignity and standing stands in tension with the reality that they "are receiving at the hands of the state a very
real slap in the face" that they would not be receiving were they members of a majority religion. (64)
Insofar as people's recognition self-respect is tied to their experience of their interpersonal worth, requiring cultural minorities to
choose between adherence to their cultural commitments and access to resources when more privileged groups would never
be expected to make such a choice is damaging to members' self-respect above and beyond any impact that forcing minorities
to act in ways that violate their conception of the good might have on their evaluative self-respect. (65)
3. The Limits of Entitlement
In light of the above, we can identify three ways in which having to forsake religious beliefs and cultural commitments for the
sake of accessing resources is qualitatively different from having to forgo expensive tastes for cheaper alternatives. First,
religious and cultural commitments often have the status of beliefs that cannot be changed through an act of volition alone.
People can of course choose not to act on their religious beliefs and cultural commitments, or to act in ways that contradict
them. But doing so endangers their evaluative self-respect. This highlights a second source of difference between asking
people to forsake their religious beliefs and cultural commitments and asking them to forgo expensive tastes. Finally, in cases
in which privileged groups' religious beliefs and cultural commitments have historically been accommodated in functionally
equivalent cases, requiring minorities to forgo their beliefs and commitments can strike minorities as highly discriminatory and
unfair, thereby wounding their recognition self-respect. What follows from this analysis concerning the provision of exemptions
and accommodations? Are religious and cultural minorities entitled to additional resources simply because of the costliness of
their commitments?
On a resource-egalitarian approach, people may only advance claims against each other in respect of their enjoyment of
primary goods, not the costliness of realizing their aims and ambitions. So the fact that, say, Jews who observe Kosher face
additional costs acquiring meat in a society in which they are a small minority does not itself show that we ought to subsidize
the costs that they face acquiring Kosher meat. What has to be further demonstrated is that general rules burden people's
religious beliefs and cultural commitments in a way that prevents them from accessing their fair share of primary goods. How
do general rules interact with minorities' religious beliefs and cultural commitments to deny them their fair share of primary
goods? There are two types of cases that need to be considered: direct and indirect cases.
Direct Cases
Direct cases are instances where the contested rules requiring minorities to forgo their religious or cultural commitments
concern the conditions of access to important primary goods or resources, such as education. Examples here are the
accommodation requests by Jews to be allowed to vote on a day other than a Saturday, and requests by Muslims and Sikhs to
be exempted from mandatory school uniform requirements inasmuch as these claims relate specifically to the conditions of
access to goods/opportunities that all, regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion have a right to as a matter of justice from a
resource-egalitarian perspective. Direct cases are the clearest instances of where an equality of resources approach supports
exemption rights. For if, as I have argued, religious beliefs and cultural commitments are nonrevisable for the sake of resource
expectations, people cannot be expected to have to give up these commitments for the sake of accessing primary goods to
which they are entitled to as a matter of justice, especially when this might endanger their evaluative self-respect. To insist on
the universal enforcement of contested rules in these cases leads to an inequality of resources: if those claiming exemption
forgo their religious or cultural commitments for the sake of accessing the primary good in question, they jeopardize their
evaluative self-respect. On the other hand, if they refuse to give up their religious or cultural commitments for the sake of
safeguarding their personal integrity and self-respect, then they must forgo a primary good that members of more privileged
groups can access without jeopardizing their evaluative self-respect.
When the refusal of an exemption would also endanger claimants' recognition self-respect--either because privileged groups
have historically received similar exemptions or would receive an exemption were it their interests and needs that were being
burdened by the law--the case for awarding an exemption is stronger again given the additional harms that the universal
enforcement of the contested rule would do to minorities' self-respect. However, it is not essential that claimants' recognition
self-respect be at stake in order for an exemption to be warranted. That a contested rule, if universally enforced, would force
some to choose between retaining their evaluative self-respect or accessing the primary good regulated by the rule provides a
sufficient reason to grant an exemption. An example here might be a claim by Jehovah's Witnesses that they should have a
fight to be treated with synthetic blood substitutes when receiving medical treatment (the availability of synthetic blood
substitutes makes it possible to perform surgery in some cases without infringing Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs). (66) Access to
healthcare is clearly an important good from a resource-egalitarian perspective. And, although requiring Jehovah's Witnesses
to receive a blood transfusion would endanger their evaluative self-respect, it is not clear that this would also threaten their
recognition self-respect, since Jehovah's Witnesses have not generally been subject to discriminatory treatment at the hands of
the majority in the way that, say, Native Americans have. Nonetheless, there is still a prima facie case for accommodating
Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs here insofar as, if we assume a universal fight to healthcare, then the refusal to provide synthetic
blood substitutes instead of human blood transfusions would prevent many Jehovah's Witnesses from accessing a good to
which they have a right to as a matter of justice. I say that the case for accommodation is a prima facie one, however, because
it is important to also consider what the costs of accommodation would be in terms of other people's access to primary goods
and in terms of the state's ability to safeguard important public purposes.
Even when general rules burden minorities' commitments in a way that makes it difficult for them to access a particular primary
good without endangering their evaluative self-respect, accommodation can sometimes put at risk important public purposes
and even other people's enjoyment of primary goods. To continue with the example of synthetic blood substitutes, these are
very costly to provide, and so granting an unconditional fight to Jehovah's Witnesses to be treated with blood substitutes
wherever possible could put the medical treatment of non-Jehovah's Witnesses at risk. (67) Accommodation in such cases
does not succeed in ensuring that all enjoy access to their fair share of primary goods, since it jeopardizes non-Jehovah's
Witnesses' access to healthcare. Hence, the resource-egalitarian argument for accommodation/ exemption arguably fails in this
instance. Similarly with accommodation demands that would undermine claimants' own access to the primary goods at issue in
contested rules. Consider the numerous demands that minorities have made to be exempted from mandatory educational
requirements, such as the request by the Amish in Wisconsin to be exempted from the requirement to attend school up until
the age of 16 and requests by conservative Christians to have their children excused from science classes in which evolution is
taught. (68) If we assume that the sort of educational opportunities that liberal egalitarians would insist upon include learning
about science and staying in school beyond the tenth grade--admittedly, this in itself is a controversial assumption--it is difficult
to see how either of these accommodations would promote equality of resources or reduce the obstacles that claimants face
accessing the primary good of education in the way that, say, exemptions from mandatory uniform requirements remove
impediments preventing certain minorities from availing of the same educational opportunities as members of more privileged
groups.
Notwithstanding cases in which the provision of an exemption would itself threaten either claimants' or other people's
enjoyment of primary goods, there is a strong resource-egalitarian case for awarding exemptions when the universal
enforcement of contested rules governing the conditions of access to primary goods would put at risk claimants' evaluative self-
respect. Of course, which particular exemption rights can be defended via this line of argument will depend on which goods
and opportunities are counted as primary goods. While the exemption of Sikhs, Jews, and Muslims from mandatory uniform
requirements in the police and in schools and the accommodation of Jews' observance of the Sabbath in the scheduling of
elections can be straightforwardly justified on this approach, inasmuch as access to education and the opportunity to serve in
the police and to vote in elections are undeniably important opportunities from a resource-egalitarian perspective, other oft-
cited claims less obviously involve opportunities that uncontroversially count as primary goods. Take the example of the
exemption that Sikhs have sought from the requirement to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle or bicycle. Is the
opportunity to ride a motorcycle or bicycle a primary good? Certainly, in industrialized societies in which people often live a long
way from their place of work and from important public services and amenities, access to some form of transport is
undoubtedly important. But if those seeking an exemption from the requirement to wear a crash helmet can easily afford to
travel by car instead of by motorcycle or bicycle, or they have access to a public transport network that adequately services
their transport needs, the case for an exemption on grounds of equality of resources may be relatively weak.
The provision of a comprehensive account of when an exemption claim counts as a direct case involving a conflict between
claimants' evaluative self-respect and their access to primary goods would require setting out a detailed account of the index of
primary goods, a project that is beyond the scope of this paper. While the absence of such an account of the index of primary
goods inevitably leaves many questions unanswered about the particular exemption and accommodation claims that can be
defended on grounds of equality of resources, my purpose in this paper is not so much to arrive at a definitive list of justified
exemption and accommodation claims, but to explain how the provision of cultural exemptions is different from the
subsidization of expensive tastes and why the provision of cultural exemptions can be justified from a resource-egalitarian
perspective. This project does not depend on being committed to any particular account of the index of primary goods. Different
indices of primary goods will pick out different exemption claims as being justifiable on grounds of equality of resources. But
this does not change the logic of the argument for why these exemptions are justifiable from a resource-egalitarian perspective,
only the cases to which it applies.
Indirect cases
Indirect cases are instances where the contested rules do not relate specifically to the conditions of access to a primary good
but where the universal enforcement of the contested rule may nevertheless put claimants' evaluative or recognition self-
respect at risk. Exemption claims from animal slaughtering laws are examples of indirect cases insofar as the opportunity to eat
meat is generally not regarded as a primary good to which all should be entitled as a matter of justice. Hence, if the design of
animal slaughtering laws means that certain Jews and Muslims find themselves unable to eat meat, this does not mean that
they thereby enjoy less than their fair share of primary goods. The argument for accommodation is weaker in indirect cases
because there is no fight as a matter of justice to the good/opportunity regulated by the contested rule. The universal
enforcement of general rules in indirect cases, in contrast to direct cases, will not necessarily cause claimants to suffer a deficit
in primary goods. Even so, considerations of fairness and reasonableness may still support the provision of exemptions in
certain indirect cases.
Considerations of fairness support the provision of exemptions in indirect cases in instances where the religious and cultural
commitments of privileged groups have before been accommodated in functionally equivalent ways and where the refusal of
accommodation would consequently be destructive to claimants' recognition self-respect because it would signal disrespect for
their status as citizens of equal dignity and standing. The refusal to exempt the ritual ingesting of peyote from drug prohibitions
when the sacramental use of wine has previously been exempted from alcohol prohibitions is a case in point. It is important to
recognize, however, that the case for exemptions on grounds of fairness is wholly conditional: had the sacramental use of wine
not been accommodated previously within alcohol prohibitions, and had Native Americans not historically been subject to
discriminatory and oppressive treatment at the hands of the majority, the refusal to exempt the ritual ingesting of peyote from
drug prohibitions would not elicit disrespect for the equal dignity and standing of Native Americans in anything like the same
way. (69)
In indirect cases in which the uniform application of a rule would put claimants' evaluative rather than recognition self-respect at
risk, the refusal of accommodation is not necessarily unfair, but it may be unreasonable. The cases I have in mind are cases in
which general rules require people to violate commitments of conscience. An example here is the burden that military service
requirements place on conscientious objectors. What distinguishes this example from the previous example is that whereas
drug prohibitions do not require Native Americans to violate their convictions of conscience, military service requirements
necessarily endanger conscientious objectors' evaluative self-respect by compelling them to do what they are opposed in
conscience to doing. The refusal of accommodation in such cases could be considered unreasonable inasmuch as the state
"should usually not try to compel people to do what they are opposed in conscience to doing." (70) One reason is that
compelling people to do what they are opposed in conscience to doing threatens people's attachment to the state insofar as
people's attachment to the state is partly bound up with their sense that the state is an instrument of their freedom rather than
their oppression. Another important consideration in favor of not compelling people to do what they are opposed in conscience
to doing stems from the centrality of liberty of conscience to liberal freedom, a point well captured by Charles Taylor in his
response to the hypothetical apologist for Albanian socialism:
We recognise that religion has been abolished in Albania, whereas it hasn't in Britain. But on the other hand there are probably
far fewer traffic lights per head in Tirana than in London ... Suppose an apologist for Albanian Socialism were nevertheless to
claim that this country were far freer than Britain, because the number of acts restricted was far smaller. After all, only a
minority of Londoners practice some religion in public places, but all have to negotiate their way through traffic. Those who do
practise a religion generally do so on one day of the week, while they are held up at traffic lights every day. (71)
Taylor's response is to point out that what matters is not the number of freedoms that people enjoy, but the quality of those
freedoms. Sometimes people's commitments of conscience are such that it is impossible to avoid forcing them to do what they
are opposed in conscience to doing without seriously undermining important public purposes. Some Amish, for example, are
opposed to making social security contributions for religious reasons. (72) But in other cases in which it is feasible to avoid
forcing citizens to violate their commitments of conscience without incurring serious cost, or without infringing upon people's
rights, it seems unreasonable not to do so. However, the case for exemption here is much weaker than in direct cases, as
claimants have no right to the goods and opportunities regulated by the contested rules in indirect cases, and it is practically
impossible for the state to ensure that all citizens possess evaluative self-respect (e.g., some citizens' enjoyment of evaluative
self-respect may depend on successfully carrying out a life-plan that is fundamentally unjust). To this extent, the argument here
for the provision of exemptions is one from benevolence rather than justice in that there is no obligation of justice to
accommodate the law to minorities' religious beliefs and cultural commitments, although the impact that a universal
enforcement of the law would have on individuals' liberty of conscience provides a powerful reason to grant an exemption in
cases in which it is feasible to do so.
4. Exemptions for Whom?
We have so far considered the kinds of exemption and accommodation claims that are defensible from a resource-egalitarian
perspective: (a) direct cases involving general rules that cause a conflict between claimants' access to primary goods and the
conditions of their evaluative self-respect; (b) indirect cases in which the refusal of accommodation, for contingent, historical
reasons, would threaten the social bases of claimants' recognition self-respect; and, to a lesser extent, (c) indirect cases where
general rules unreasonably force claimants to do what they are opposed in conscience to doing. But we have yet to properly
consider the question of who should be entitled to an exemption in cases that fit the relevant descriptions: only members of
particular named religious or cultural communities whose commitments are burdened by the contested rules or any individual
who can make a claim that a contested rule burdens her commitments of conscience in the functionally relevant way? For
example, if Sikhs are to be exempted from prohibitions against the carrying of knives so as to allow them to carry their kirpans
in public, should we not also exempt individuals who have similar reasons for objecting to restrictions against the carrying of
weapons even though they may not belong to any group protesting those rules? British Sikhs' request to be allowed to carry
their kirpans was accommodated within the provisions of the U.K. Criminal Justice Act (1988) restricting the carrying of
weapons by writing into the provisions that it is a defense for a person accused of breaching the provisions to prove that he had
the article with him for "religious reasons." Hence, Sikhs as a group are not explicitly exempted, although the liberty of
individual Sikhs to carry a kirpan is still safeguarded. Famously, Arthur Uther Pendragon, a former Hell's Angel who was
arrested at a demonstration in Trafalgar Square, successfully contested the confiscation of his three-foot-long, double-edged
sword by police by appealing to the provisions of the U.K. Criminal Justice Act intended for the accommodation of Sikhs. He
argued that, as the Official Swordbearer of the Secular Order of Druids, and being the twentieth-century reincarnation of King
Arthur, he had religious reasons for carrying his sword to the demonstration. The magistrate agreed. (73) But should a person's
entitlement to an exemption turn on his or her group membership?
The group membership of claimants is arguably a very important consideration in indirect cases in which the refusal of
accommodation would be destructive of a person's recognition self-respect because of the fact he or she is a member of a
minority group that has been historically oppressed by the majority and because of the fact that the law has historically
accommodated the beliefs and commitments of more privileged groups in functionally equivalent cases. But where those
seeking accommodation are individuals with idiosyncratic commitments of conscience rather than members of minority
religious and cultural groups who have been historically oppressed, concerns about the consequences of nonaccommodation
on claimants' recognition self-respect are less relevant. However, when the exemption claims at issue concern a conflict
between general rules and people's evaluative self-respect, making the case for exemption turn on a person's group
membership is problematic. First, awarding exemptions on a group-differentiated basis is unfair to nongroup members and
individuals with idiosyncratic commitments of conscience whose beliefs and commitments are burdened by general rules in
functionally equivalent ways. Consider the example of exemptions from mandatory military service requirements, which were
initially awarded only to select religious groups such as Quakers, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mennonites. (74) Such an
approach is unfairly discriminatory insofar as the beliefs of individual conscientious objectors prevent them from serving in the
military in functionally equivalent ways to those of Quakers, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mennonites. A second difficulty with
awarding exemptions on an explicitly group-differentiated basis is that this can undermine diversity of belief and liberty of
conscience within communities.
Not all Sikhs accept that they have a religious obligation to wear a turban or to carry the kirpan. (75) If Sikhs are exempted as a
group from the requirement to wear a crash helmet on the grounds that the majority of Sikhs take wearing a turban to be a
requirement of Sikhism, this can reify and entrench the view that Sikh men must wear a turban.(76) Any ruling by a legislature
or court that wearing a turban is a requirement of Sikhism would of course be an infringement of the separation between
church and state; "the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious dogma," as Justice Lacobucci
of the Supreme Court of Canada has rightly argued. (77) Courts in the U.S., Canada, and elsewhere have, for this reason,
adopted a subjectivist or personal conception of freedom of religion when assessing the merit of accommodation and
exemption claims. Such an approach downplays the role of religious leaders and scholars in establishing whether a contested
law or practice burdens claimants' freedom of belief, and instead bases the case for exemption on what particular individuals
claiming exemption perceive the requirements of their faith to be. Thus, in the Multani case, the Supreme Court of Canada
accepted that a school's ban on the carrying of knives burdened a Sikh student's freedom of religion and prevented him from
enjoying the opportunity of attending public school even though other Sikh students were prepared to wear replica kirpans
made out of material. (78) Similarly in Thomas v. Review Board--a U.S. case involving an appeal by a Jehovah's Witness
against a decision to deny him unemployment assistance for quitting his job without "good cause"--the court accepted that the
claimant was sincere in his belief that he would be violating a deep-seated religious commitment if he worked on a production
line manufacturing weapons parts even though other Jehovah's Witnesses were prepared to do such work. (79) As Justice
Berger argued in handing down his ruling, "it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the
petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith." (80) Rather, all that must be
considered is the sincerity of the petitioner's claim that the contested rule substantially burdens a religious belief or commitment
of conscience that he or she holds in good faith. This is established not by considering what the claimant's co-religionists or
religious leaders take to be the requirements of his or her faith, but by considering whether the belief or commitment in
question is being asserted in good faith and in consistency with his or her other beliefs and commitments. (81)
One criticism leveled against such an individualized and subjective approach to the provision of exemptions is the difficulty that
it creates for administration of the law. It is far easier to establish whether a contested rule substantially burdens a person's
commitments of conscience when that person is a member of a recognized religious or cultural group and the commitments at
issue are widely known to be professed by members of that community. Consider a religious believer, such as a Catholic,
whose religion is not widely considered to be opposed to war but who, upon being nominated for mandatory combat duty,
claims that the Angel Gabriel visited him in a dream to command him not to go to war. How are we to determine whether he is
being sincere or opportunist? Fortunately, the danger that adopting an individualist approach to exemptions might lead to an
escalation in fraudulent claims can be offset by structuring the provision of exemptions so that the costs involved in taking up
exemption militate against fraudulent claims. For example, Kent Greenawalt suggests that those who apply to be exempted
from combat duty should instead have to perform a substantially lengthier period of civilian service (for example, three years of
civilian service instead of one year of combat duty). (82) Greenawalt elsewhere entertains the idea of imposing a monetary levy
on those who take up other sorts of exemptions as a way of further reducing the risk of fraudulent claims. (83) For example,
Sikhs wishing to avoid crash helmet requirements could be asked to pay higher insurance premiums, or school students
wishing to carry a kirpan could be charged a fee to do so. While this may well reduce the risk of fraudulent claims, it does so
only by imposing unfair costs on those whose commitments of conscience preclude them from accessing primary goods in the
absence of accommodation. If the cost of having to renege on deep-seated commitments of conscience unfairly inhibits Sikhs
from accessing public education in the absence of an exemption from mandatory uniform requirements, then it is equally unfair
to force Sikhs to pay more than other students to access education. Nonetheless, there are other, less punitive, ways in which
we can structure exemptions that need not be any less effective in reducing the risk of fraudulent claims. For example, one
possibility with respect to providing exemptions from mandatory crash helmet laws is to require those seeking exemption to
present two signed statutory declarations from witnesses in support of their claim before granting them a permit to ride without
a crash helmet. Other types of exemptions could be similarly structured to reduce the risk of fraudulent claims. Schools, for
instance, could insist that a student's parent or guardian first meet with school officials before excusing that student from
mandatory dress codes. In most cases, students who did not have a conscientious objection to mandatory uniform
requirements would be unlikely to receive the support of their parent or guardian in avoiding school uniform requirements. The
details of how exemptions could be structured to reduce the risk of fraudulent claims would need to be worked out in much
greater detail of course. But I see no reason to think that the provision of exemptions along an individual rather than group-
differentiated approach necessarily leads to an excess risk of fraudulent claims or that it would make the administration of law
impossible.
5. Conclusion
If the argument of this paper is correct, requiring people to forgo religious beliefs or cultural commitments (along with other
types of conviction of conscience) in response to resource expectations is qualitatively distinct from requiring those with
expensive tastes to revise these in favor of cheaper alternatives inasmuch as people's religious beliefs and cultural
commitments often feature as beliefs that cannot be forsaken simply because of their costliness and inasmuch as the
conditions of people's self-respect are bound up with the integrity of their religious beliefs and cultural commitments in a way
that does not apply to the pursuit of the expensive tastes that feature prominently in the literature. Because we cannot
reasonably expect people to give up their deep-seated convictions of conscience in the face of resource expectations, ensuring
that all enjoy a fair share of primary goods requires the provision of cultural exemptions where general rules force minorities to
choose between upholding their religious beliefs and cultural commitments, on the one hand, and enjoying their fare share of
primary goods, on the other. This is all the more so in cases in which the beliefs and commitments of more privileged groups
have been accommodated in functionally equivalent cases, given the consequences of nonaccommodation for minorities'
recognition self-respect. While many difficult questions concerning the provision of cultural exemptions undoubtedly remain--for
example, how do we determine whether particular claims constitute direct or indirect cases--I hope that this paper has shown
that the provision of cultural exemptions can be successfully distinguished from the subsidization of expensive tastes and that
the expensive tastes objection to cultural exemptions can be faced down without having to resort to a primordial view of culture
that places people's religious beliefs and cultural commitments as beyond contestation and revision. (84)
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